Пресс-релиз

Хабаровская канцелярия Генерального консульства
Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики в г.Владивостоке предоставляет вниманию читателей интересные статьи о КНДР, написанные западными журналистами.

(Author: Christopher Black, http://journal-neo.org/2016/03/20/syria-and-korea-the-logic-of-peace-and-war/)

The bold initiative by the Russian government to withdraw some of its forces from Syria is a lesson in the use of limited military means to achieve limited political ends. With the finesse of a skilled surgeon, the Russian intervention saved the Syrian government from being overwhelmed by the NATO proxies attacking it, inflicted a fatal blow to the American attempt to achieve hegemony in the Middle East, enhanced Russian prestige in the world, and demonstrated that the economic warfare being waged against Russia by the USA, EU and Canada, has had no effect on either Russian determination to choose an independent foreign policy or the military means to put it into effect.

The confusion and consternation in the NATO block as they realise that, once again, they have been outwitted, is dramatic. Once again the western intelligence services have proved to be asleep at the wheel, and their government leadership mired in fantasies of their own creation. The embarrassed silence from Washington, which for months has been claiming that Russia was going to be bogged down and chewed up by the Syrian war, reflects the incompetence of its political leadership, from President Obama to the contenders for the Presidency in the current American elections. None of them know what to do, except react in frustration, a reaction that does not exactly lead to rational policies.

The achievement of the limited ceasefire a few weeks ago, forced on the Americans by the reality on the battlefield, set up the logic of this partial withdrawal. The withdrawal underscores the Russian and Syrian policy of achieving a satisfactory political settlement of the war, forces the western powers to support that policy, or be declared opponents of peace, yet, at the same time, gives Russia and Syria the flexibility to respond to any attempts to escalate the violence from whatever direction they may come.

The Russian defence ministry has stated that the remaining Russian air group will continue to provide air support to the Syrian forces and will continue to hit the groups that refuse to abide by the ceasefire or those determined to be “terrorist” groups, in fact the bulk of the forces attacking the Syrian people. Further the S400 air defence systems are to remain in place to cover the Russian forces remaining and to deter aggression from Turkey, Saudi Arabia or American forces. Yet, the withdrawal signals a clear de-escalation of the war and can be taken as an announcement that the enemy has been dealt a fatal blow.

This initiative was taken at the same time that Russia protested any further NATO military actions against Libya unless they had Security Council approval and at the same time that it joined China in calling for the Americans to reduce the pressure on North Korea and commit to a final and peaceful resolution of the conflict on the Korean peninsular. Unfortunately, both Russia and China have joined the United States in condemning North Korea’s attempts to defend itself with nuclear weapons against the threat of nuclear war coming from the United States.

This condemnation seems to be in reaction to the fear that North Korea’s defence doctrine will provoke the USA into launching a war that will affect all Asia or, at the least, give the Americans an excuse to put new anti-ballistic missile systems into south Korea which will threaten the security of not only North Korea but also China and Russia. Perhaps they have a valid point and perhaps there are other reasons unknown to us that prompted them to join in the virtual blockade of North Korea, but the injustice is blatant. All three nuclear powers are enhancing and building their own nuclear weapon systems; Saudi Arabia is making noises that it has nuclear weapons, along with Israel, without any reaction from the big three; and the government of North Korea is being threatened with continuing military exercises that threaten a immediate decapitation strike of its government and nuclear annihilation.

The current exercises being carried out in Korea are the largest ever conducted, involving over 300,000 soldiers, US aircraft carrier battle groups, nuclear submarines, B-2 bombers, Australian naval ships and, to add insult to injury, Japanese forces that attacked and occupied Korea in the Second World War and that helped the Americans to attack the north in 1950. The stated objective of the exercises is to practice Operation Plan 5015, the action plan to kill the Korean leadership, destroy its bases and invade and occupy the country. A first strike using nuclear weapons is a part of that plan.

No one denies that North Korea has reason to feel backed into a corner and no one denies that they have the right to defend themselves as Russia and China are doing against the same enemy. Logic and fairness dictate that imposing an economic blockade on North Korea is tantamount to war and that this can only have the effect of making North Korea even more desperate and determined to react. This reaction to the situation in Korea is in stark contrast to the reasoned approach Russia, with Chinese support, has taken in Syria or Russia’s handling of the on-going crisis in Ukraine.

It would seem obvious that the best way to reduce tension in Korea is to support North Korea in the same way that Syria has been supported, with some guarantee of its security and a diplomatic initiative to force the Americans to back down and come to terms with the government and people of the country. North Korea has stated time and again that all it wants is to be left alone and to have a peace treaty with the United States and a guarantee that it will not be attacked. Then it is prepared to consider eliminating its nuclear weapons systems.

The world breathes a sigh of relief that a peaceful resolution of the war in Syria has shifted from a dream to a distinct possibility but now we face the risk of world war in Asia. North Korea is Asia’s eastern flank. If it is destroyed and its territory occupied by the United States and Japan and other allies, can China and Russia have any doubt what will happen next? It would seem that North Korea is a natural ally of both, but evidently not.

Meanwhile, the world watches the American elections and what it sees is a Fellini film in which the most grotesque of humanity vie for power over the military forces now threatening the world. President Obama, the man who won the Nobel Peace Prize, is the same man who ordered the military operations in Korea. This is about as peaceful a leader as we can hope for in that militaristic nation. What comes next will be even worse. Surely, there must be an attempt to bring peace to Korea as in Syria. But for that to take place, the pressure on North Korea must be reduced, and its government treated with respect and dignity. The doors to dialogue must be opened, instead of slammed shut, so reason and goodwill can prevail over the fear and malevolence that now guide the actions of the big powers. In Syria, war turns toward peace but, in Korea, peace is threatened by war. Both have their logic; the logic of peace and war, but the world is weary of the logic of war.

COLUMN-North Korea is a nuclear power. Here's why the world just has to live with it.

(Fri Mar 11, 2016,  Bennett Ramberg)

(ennett Ramberg served as a policy analyst in the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs in the George H.W. Bush administration. He is the author of "Nuclear Power Plants as Weapons for the Enemy." The opinions expressed here are his own.)

What are Washington and its allies to do about North Korea? In January, Pyongyang tested its fourth nuclear device. It launched a satellite in February to gather additional data for developing an intercontinental ballistic missile. Meanwhile, North Korean engineers keep cranking out weapons material that could fuel dozens of nuclear bombs in years to come.

The international response continues to be ineffective. After much pouting from concerned countries, the United Nations Security Council recently responded to the new round of tests with an impressive new collection of sanctions.

The sanctions promise to halt the movement of contraband by monitoring North Korean commerce moving in and out of the country, prohibit the export of jet and rocket fuel to Pyongyang, block the North's ability to conduct international financial transactions and ban the export of North Korean coal and minerals. But they are not enough. Even combined with the previous sanctions, this will not move the North off its nuclear pedestal. It is simply too late.

First, it is inconceivable that North Korean leader Kim Jong Un would give up the weapon that places his nation in the exclusive global nuclear club. Pyongyang has invested so much and come so far to mature a nuclear program that provides it with an atomic deterrent and a means of intimidation. Second, history repeatedly shows that sanctions are unlikely to be fully enforced or sufficient to squeeze North Korea.

Washington and its allies must now come to the realization that it is time to adapt.

Adaptation has already begun. South Korea has made a multi-year commitment to increase its military budget and modernize its conventional forces. It has begun deploying longer-range surface-to-surface missiles and is acquiring U.S. F-35 strike aircraft. Seoul is talking with Washington about installing the sophisticated missile defense system Terminal High Altitude Area Defense or THAAD. Collectively, beefing up of its conventional forces bolsters Seoul's deterrence capabilities.

Yet many in South Korea still fear that Seoul's military buildup will not be enough. Some conservative legislators and others both in and out of government have called for the country to go nuclear. Were that to occur, Seoul would follow the path of several countries - the Soviet Union, Britain, France and Pakistan - that responded in kind to their adversaries' possession of nuclear weapons.

However, any move by South Korea to break its Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty vows would pit it against its crucial ally, Washington, which doggedly opposes nuclear proliferation whether by friend or foe.

In addition, nuclear acquisition would present South Korea with its own challenges. Though the country has the technical capacity to build a bomb, it could take years for it to perfect a delivery device and marshal an effective deterrent, or use doctrine. The effort would prove costly because it would divert scarce defense dollars from other vital security needs. It would also raise the ire of China.

Impressing upon North Korea that no good will come from its bomb remains critical. It raises the question of whether more good could come from Washington's return of nuclear weapons to South Korea - the United States removed them in 1991 as the Cold War ended.

Given North Korea's unabated nuclear development, is it time to reassess that 1991 decision? Re-installing the weapons would raise a host of additional issues: Would deployment enhance deterrence or make Pyongyang more trigger happy? Would it provide Seoul enough reassurance to eliminate any inclination to go nuclear? Or is offshore deployment enough?

Then, there is the matter of Beijing's response. Would the return of the bomb to South Korean soil prompt a major dustup in Sino-U.S. relations? Or would it demonstrate Washington's commitment to assure the security of all its East Asian allies?

These open questions deserve robust public debate in the United States and South Korea. But so does another matter, now even more off the radar. Is it time for the United States to reach out to North Korea, to formally concede what it cannot change - namely that North Korea is a nuclear-armed nation - not as any favor to the Stalinist regime but to generate a quid pro quo, the establishment of official liaison offices in the two countries' capitals? This would put in place a permanent face-to-face communication link to defuse the risk of war should tensions mount.

The alternative - keeping North Korea ever more isolated - perpetuates the fantasy that Pyongyang still can be sanctioned or otherwise induced to give up its nuclear bombs. Rather, the challenge now is not to bolster quixotic policies but to nurture others that assure Kim's bomb does not give birth to a 21st-century nuclear war.

North Korea has a famous brewery that makes a sought-after beer

(Megan Willett,  May 16, 2016)

When you think of countries that make great beer, Germany and Belgium might come to mind. Probably not North Korea. Turns out, North Korea’s state-run beer distillery actually makes a decent brew, at least according to some of the reviewers who have actually been able to visit the hermit kingdom and try it out for themselves. Reuters went inside one of the factories back in 2008. Keep reading to see what a North Korean distillery looks like and what the beer tastes like.  Back in 2000, North Korea decided to acquire an old British brewery plant that had ceased operations.

It cost £1.5 million — nearly $3 million at today's conversion and inflation rates — to purchase and was shipped to and rebuilt in the capital city of Pyongyang. The factory was up and running by 2002. By 2008, the factory employed 350 North Koreans. The state-run beer is called Taedonggang, named after a river that runs through the capital. While most of the ingredients come from outside North Korea, the water used to make the beer is extremely fresh since the country's factories don't produce much pollution.  According to Reuters, North Korea's factories simply "do not produce enough to cause pollution problems."

Although soju, a vodka-like drink, is popular in North Korea, the country also loves its beer. Beer is cheap in North Korea, averaging around 500 North Korean won for a 500 mililiter bottle, according to multiple reports. That's around $0.50 at the current exchange rate. Korean characters read, "Let's urge strongly for modernization of people's economy!"

Though the widely reported exchange rate is 8,000 won to US $1, the official North Korean rate that foreigners are charged is around 100 won to US $1, according to the AP. The types of beer the facility makes are named after numbers, like Beer Number 1, Beer Number 2, etc. Many visitors are surprised at the quality of North Korea’s beer, which has an alcohol content of 5%, on par with many American beers. The taste is described as a “full-bodied lager on the sweet side.” Not everyone is impressed — reviewers at beer rating site Beer Advocate gave it about 2.5 stars with many commenters saying it tasted metallic.

The bottles are also hard to transport. The glass used is fragile, and according to some reports, the bottles are not always properly sealed.

 Still, nearly everyone agrees it’s a better than some South Korean beers, which are known for being on the watery side.

 Apart from Taedonggang, there’s also Paradise Microbrewery and the Yanggakdo Hotel Microbrewery in North Korea.

And one man who took a beer tour of the country told Wired that there are many little micro breweries outside the capital. It’s cheaper to make your own beer than to have it shipped in.

 Still, due to North Korea's politics and poor infrastructure, it's hard to find Taedonggang beer outside the hermit kingdom.